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Summary
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a key component of DOD planning for
transformation of the military.  NCW relies on computer processing power and
networked communications technology to provide a shared awareness of the battle
space for U.S. forces.  Proponents say that a shared awareness increases synergy for
command and control, resulting in superior decision-making, and the ability to
coordinate complex military operations over long distances for an overwhelming
war-fighting advantage.  NCW technology saw limited deployment in Afghanistan
and, more recently, increased deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Several
DOD key programs are now underway for deployment throughout all services.  
Congress may be concerned with oversight of the DOD organization and the
individual services as they transform through NCW programs that are intended to
promote a management style and culture with joint objectives.  Oversight may
involve a review of service efforts to improve interoperability of computer and
communications systems, and may also involve questions from some observers about
whether DOD has given adequate attention to possible unintended outcomes resulting
from over-reliance on high technology.  Updates may also be required on emerging
threats that may be directed against increasingly complex military equipment.  
The background section of this report describes technologies that support NCW,
and includes (1) questions about possible vulnerabilities associated with NCW; (2)
a description of directed energy weapons, and other technologies that could be used
as asymmetric countermeasures against NCW systems; (3) descriptions of some key
military programs for implementing NCW; (4) a list of other nations with NCW
capabilities; and, (5) a description of experiences using NCW systems in recent
operations involving joint and coalition forces.  The final section raises policy issues
for NCW that involve planning, budget, network interoperability, acquisition
strategies, offshore outsourcing, technology transfer, asymmetric threats, coalition
operations, and U.S. military doctrine.  
Appendices to this report give more information about the global network
conversion to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), and possible perverse consequences
of data-dependent systems.
This report will be updated to accommodate significant changes.  
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1 For more information, see CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background
and Oversight Issues for Congress.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003.
Network Centric Warfare: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report provides background information and discusses possible oversight
issues for Congress on DOD’s strategy for implementing network centric warfare
(NCW).  NCW forms a central part of the Administration’s plans for defense
transformation. Possible issues for Congress are whether to approve, modify, or reject
the Administration’s plans for implementing NCW.  Congress’ decisions on this issue
could affect future U.S. military capabilities, the composition of U.S. defense
spending, and the ability of U.S. military forces to operate in conjunction with allied
military forces.  Additionally, while proponents argue that NCW may improve both
the efficiency and effectiveness of combat operations, others argue that questions
remain about (1) the interoperability of information systems for joint and coalition
forces, (2) a shortage of available bandwidth to support NCW operations, and (3)
possible unexpected outcomes when using data-dependent systems.  
Background
Defense Transformation 
 Defense transformation involves large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly
disruptive changes in military weapons, organization, and concepts of operations (i.e.,
approaches to warfighting) that are prompted by significant changes in technology or
the emergence of new and different international security challenges.1  Many
observers believe that a U.S. military transformation is necessary to ensure U.S. forces
continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support of
national  objectives.2  The administration has stated that DOD must transform to
achieve a fundamentally joint, network centric, distributed force structure capable of
rapid decision superiority.  To meet this goal, DOD is building doctrine, training, and
procurement practices to create a culture of continual transformation that involves
people, processes, and systems. 
CRS-2
3 Network Centric Operations is a theory that is being tested as part of an ongoing research
program.  The Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and the Command and Control
Research Program (CCRP) of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) have been collaborating
to develop metrics to support Transformation related experiments, studies, and analyses. To
date the effort has been led by RAND, with support from Evidence Based Research, Inc.
(EBR), and participation of the government sponsors.  The theory posits that the application
of information technologies has a positive impact on military effectiveness.  Independent
variables include networking, information sharing, collaboration, etc.  Dependent variables
include speed of command and force effectiveness. Dr. Kimberly Holloman, Evidence
Based Research, Inc., The Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework,
Presentation at the Network Centric Warfare 2004 Conference, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20,
2004,  [http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library.cfm?libcol=2].
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Network Centric Warfare, 2001,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/NCW/ncw_sense.pdf] , and Ret. Admiral Arthur Cebrowski,
Speech to Network Centric Warfare 2003 Conference, Jan. 2003, [http://www.oft.osd.mil].
5 “Fog” is the term that describes the uncertainty about what is going on during a battle,
while “Friction” is the term that describes the difficulty translating a commander’s intent
into battlefield actions.
Definition of Network Centric Warfare 
The network centric approach to warfare is the military embodiment of
information age concepts.  Studies3 have shown that networking enables forces to
undertake a different range of missions than non-networked forces, by improving both
efficiency and effectiveness of operations.  NCW uses computers and communications
to link people through information flows that depend on the interoperability of
systems used by all U.S. armed forces.  NCW involves collaboration and sharing of
information to ensure that all appropriate assets can be quickly brought to bear by
commanders during combat operations.4  Procurement policy to support NCW is also
intended to improve economic efficiency by eliminating stove-pipe systems, parochial
interests, redundant and non-interoperable systems, and by optimizing capital planning
investments for present and future information technology systems.   Objectives of
NCW include the following:
(1) Self-synchronization, or doing what needs to be done without traditional orders;
(2) Improved understanding of higher command’s intent;
(3) Improved understanding of the operational situation at all levels of command;
and,
(4) Increased ability to tap into the collective knowledge of all U.S. (and coalition)
forces  to reduce the “fog and friction” commonly referred to in descriptions of
fighting.5
DOD describes its strategy for implementing NCW in a publication titled,
“Network Centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage,” released in
January 2004 by the Office of Force Transformation.  Key elements for
implementation include the following:
(1) Refine the rules and theory of NCW through simulation, testing,
experimentation, and combat experience.
CRS-3
6  Dr. Kimberly Holloman, Evidence Based Research, Inc., The Network Centric Operations
Conceptual Framework, Presentation at the Network Centric Warfare 2004 Conference,
Washington, D.C.,  Jan. 20, 2004,[http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library.cfm?libcol=2]. 
7 Scott Renner, C2 Information Manager, MITRE Corporation, Building Information
Systems for NCW, 4th Annual Multinational C4ISR Conference, Mclean, Virginia, May 6,
2004. 
8 Frederick Stein, Senior Engineer, MITRE Corporation, Presentation on Network Centric
Warfare Operations, 4th Annual Multinational C4ISR Conference, McLean, Virginia, May
6, 2004.
9 For more information about military network interoperability issues, and the Global
(continued...)
(2) Apply NCW theory enterprise-wide in DOD.
(3) Accelerate networking in the joint force.
(4) Accelerate deployment of network centric concepts and capabilities.
(5) Experiment with network centric concepts to develop new ways to conduct
NCW.
(6) Address challenges of using NCW with coalition forces.
(7) Develop appropriate doctrine and tactics for NCW.
Some argue that, as new concepts and technologies are proven valid over time,
NCW may extend to become a stabilizing deterrence against future conflict.  For
example, if adversary targets are neutralized by NCW systems before they can engage
in fighting with U.S. forces, then the battle can be finished before it has really begun.6
Others argue that wealthy countries now have a temporary advantage which may be
reduced as NCW technology becomes less expensive and as technical knowledge
spreads to other nations and terrorist groups.7  Some argue that to maintain its
advantage, the United States must continue to refine the uses of technology to increase
flexibility and adaptability for both joint and coalition NCW operations.
Technologies that Support NCW 
Some observers have said that the price of entry into NCW operations is the
construction of a network of sensors.  For example, aircraft and other platforms
become sensors as they are given new capabilities to communicate and combine data,
and many weapons are no longer considered simple munitions, but also become part
of the system of sensors, as they are guided to their targets until they explode.8  This
section discusses key components of a NCW system.
Network Architectures.  NCW is highly dependent on the interoperability of
communications equipment, data, and software to enable networking of people,
sensors, and manned and unmanned platforms.  Parts of NCW technology rely on line-
of-sight radio transmission for microwave or infrared signals, or laser beams.  Other
parts of the technology aggregate information for transmission through larger network
trunks for global distribution via fiber optic cables, microwave towers, or both low-
altitude and high-altitude satellites.  The designs for this technology must enable rapid
communications between individuals in all services, and rapid sharing of data and
information between mobile platforms and sensors used by all military services.9  The
CRS-4
9 (...continued)
Information Grid, see CRS Report RS21590, Defense Program Issue: Global Information
Grid, Bandwidth Expansion.
10 Seventy percent of NIPRNET traffic reportedly is routed through the civilian Internet,
Christopher Dorobek and Diane Frank, DOD may pull key net from the Internet,
InsideDefense, Dec. 26, 2002, [http://www.insidedefense.com].
11 Dan Cateriniccia, “Marines Tunnel to SIPRNET,” FederalComputerWeek.com, Dec. 9,
2002, [http://www.fcw.com].
12 DOD satellites could not satisfy the entire military demand for satellite bandwidth, and
therefore DOD has become the single largest customer for commercial satellite services.
DOD sometimes leases commercial satellite bandwidth through DISA, and at other times
bypasses the process to buy directly from industry.  Bypassing DISA may reduce
interoperability and increase redundancies. Jefferson Morris, “GAO: DOD Needs New
Approach to Buying Bandwidth,” Aerospace Daily, Dec. 12, 2003; “DISA Chief Outlines
Wartime Successes,” Federal Computer Week, June 6, 2003. 
architectures must also have the ability to dynamically self-heal and re-form the
network when one or more communications nodes are interrupted.   
Perhaps the most widely-known U.S. military networks are the Non-Classified
Internet Protocol Router Network, and  the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(NIPRNET and SIPRNET.)  The architectures for these networks isolate transmission
of classified SIPRNET messages away from the civilian Internet, while a large
percentage of less-secure NIPRNET traffic is reportedly routed through the civilian
Internet.10  In the past, some military units reportedly have used special encryption
technology to enable SIPRNET communications to be sent through the NIPRNET.11
Satellites.  Satellites are crucial for enabling mobile communications in remote
areas, as well as for providing imagery, navigation, weather information, a missile
warning capability, and a capability to “reach back” to the continental United States
for added support.  The Global Positioning System (GPS), consisting of 28 navigation
satellites, helps identify the location of U.S. forces, as well as target locations for
launching U.S. weapons, such as cruise missiles.  The United States maintains 6
orbital constellations for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): one
for early warning, two for imagery, and three for signals intelligence.  However,
despite the number of military satellites, the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) reported that up to 84 percent of the satellite communications bandwidth
provided to the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) theater was supplied by commercial
satellites.12  
Radio Bandwidth.  Digitization of communications is a key part of the DOD
programs associated with military force transformation.  Digital technology makes
more efficient use of spectrum bandwidth for communications  than does analog
technology.   However, since 1991, there has been an explosive increase in demand
for bandwidth, due to efforts to speed up the delivery of digital information.  Defense
officials remain concerned about whether the radio bandwidth supply available
through DOD systems will grow adequately to keep up with increasing military
demand in the future (see more at Bandwidth Limitations, below).
CRS-5
13 The two key programs for UAV development are the USAF’s X-45 and the Navy’s
carrier-capable X-47.  Both projects are under the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-
UCAS) program, which is led by DARPA.  DOD believes that merging these two projects
will lead to greater efficiencies and reduced acquisition costs. Adam Herbert, “New
Horizons for Combat UAVs,” Air Force Magazine, Dec. 2003.
14  For more information about UVs, see CRS Report RS21294, Unmanned Vehicles for U.S.
Naval Forces: Background and Issues for Congress.
15  Edward A. Smith, “Network Centric Warfare: Where’s the Beef?,” Submission to the
U.S. Naval War College Review, 2000,[http://www.dodccrp.org/].
16  According to statements reportedly made by Dr. Clifford Lau, DOD Office of Basic
Research, nanotechnology will affect every aspect of weaponry, communications, and the
welfare of soldiers.  Barnaby Feder, “Frontier of Military Technology is the Size of a
Molecule,” New York Times, Apr. 8, 2003, p.C2.
Unmanned Vehicles (UVs).  UVs, also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), Ground Vehicles (UGVs), and Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), are primarily
used for surveillance, however their mission is evolving to also include combat.13
During OIF, approximately 16 Predator and 1 Global Hawk UAVs were in operation,
and all were controllable remotely via satellite link from command centers in the
continental United States.  UVs each require a large amount of bandwidth for control
and for transmission of reconnaissance images, and UVs also serve as nodes that can
relay messages through the NCW network.14
Computer Processor Chips.   Gordon Moore’s Law of Integrated circuits
predicts that every 18 months, computer chips evolve to become twice as dense and
twice as fast for about the same cost, meaning they become almost 4 times as
powerful every 18 months.  Industries that use computer technology rely on Moore’s
Law as a guide for investing in future technology systems.  Many future NCW
concepts now being developed by DOD also rely on the continued evolution in
computer processing power, and may also be affected by advances in other
technologies, such as nanotechnology.
Nanotechnology.  New materials developed through nanotechnology may
eventually change battlefield equipment in ways hard to imagine.  Weapons may
become smaller and lighter, and new miniaturized network sensors may detect, locate,
identify, track, and target potential threats more efficiently.15  DOD currently uses
nanotechnology to create a heat-resistant coating that extends the life of propulsion
shafts for warships, and as an additive to boost the performance of rocket propellant.
Some observers believe that nanotechnology may eventually alter fundamental
concepts of warfare, perhaps even more than the invention of gunpowder.16  
In June 2003, MIT opened the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  The Institute was funded in March 2002 by a $50 million
grant from the Army, and will seek to develop technologies such as a handheld device
that detects chemical or biological weapons, or a flexible yet bulletproof exoskeleton
that could reduce the weight of a soldier’s equipment and protective gear by 50
pounds, while also adding biomedical sensors linked to mobile networks.  Other
CRS-6
17 “Chinese, U.S. scientists make headway in nano-wire research,” People’s Daily Online,
Feb. 1, 2004, 
18 For more information about nanotechnology, see CRS Report RS20589, Manipulating
Molecules: The National Nanotechnology Initiative.
19 U.S. General Accounting Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Stronger Management
Practices Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions,
GAO-04-393, Mar. 2004.
20  It is virtually impossible to find unauthorized and malevolent code hidden deep within
a sophisticated computer program module that may have originated from a company  in one
of more than a half-dozen countries commonly used for software outsourcing.  Mark
Willoughby, “Hidden Malware in offshore products raises concerns,” Computerworld, Sept.
15, 2003 [http://www.computerworld.com].
countries are also making advances in nanotechnology.17  However, in 2000, Asian
countries produced nearly 25,000 Ph.D. graduates in fields related to nanotechnology,
while the United States produced fewer than 5,000.18
Software.  Software is an important component of all complex defense systems
used for NCW.  GAO has recommended that DOD follow best practices of private
sector software developers to avoid the kinds of schedule delays and cost overruns that
have plagued many Pentagon programs that depend on complicated software.19  Many
observers of the software industry believe that globalization of the economy dictates
a global process for software development.  In keeping with the GAO
recommendation, contractors for DOD often outsource software development to other,
smaller private firms, and in some cases, programming work may be done by offshore
companies.  This raises questions about the possibility of malicious computer code
being used to subvert DOD computer systems.  However, Robert Lentz, the U.S.
Defense Department’s director of information assurance, reportedly has stated that
DOD is currently investigating ways to strengthen policy mechanisms to increase
DOD confidence in the security of both foreign and domestic software products.20
(See Outsourcing and Technology Transfer, below.)
Questions About NCW
While the United States has the ability to exploit advances in computer
information processing, networking, satellites, radio communications, and other
technologies, some observers question whether the United States military places too
much emphasis on technology, and others question whether information itself may be
overrated as a useful military asset (See Appendix B, Perverse Consequences of Data-
Dependent Systems).  
However, technology is only one of the underpinnings of NCW.  Other observers
state that NCW requires changes in behavior, process, and organization to convert the
advances of Information Age capabilities into combat power.  Through new uses of
NCW technologies, rigid constructs are transformed into dynamic constructs that can
provide new and advantageous flexibility for actions in combat.  Sometimes, however,
CRS-7
21  Frederick Stein, Senior Engineer, MITRE Corporation, “Presentation on Network Centric
Warfare Operations,” 4th Annual Multinational C4ISR Conference, McLean, Virginia,  May
6, 2004.
22  John Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare Offers Warfighting Advantage,” Signal Forum,
Signal Magazine, May 2003.  
23 Path-dependence means that small changes in the initial conditions will result in enormous
changes in outcomes.  Therefore, a military force must define initial conditions that are
favorable to their interests, with the goal of developing high rates of change that an
adversary cannot outpace.  Dan Cateriniccia and Matthew French, “Network-centric
warfare: Not there yet,” Federal Computer Week, June 9, 2003 [http://www.fcw
.com/fcw/articles/2003/0609/cov-netcentric-06-09-03.asp].
people may initially not fully utilize the capabilities of the new systems because they
are not yet comfortable with the required changes in behavior.21  
Advantages of NCW.  Emerging literature supports the theory that power is
increasingly derived from information sharing, information access, and speed.  This
view has been supported by results of recent military operational experiences22
showing that when forces are truly joint, with comprehensively integrated capabilities
and operating according to the principles of NCW, they can fully exploit the highly
path-dependent23 nature of information age warfare.  Some resulting military
advantages of NCW operations include the following:
(1) Networked forces can consist of smaller-size units that can travel lighter and
faster, meaning fewer troops with fewer platforms and carrying fewer supplies
can perform a mission effectively, or differently, at a lower cost. 
(2) Networked forces can fight using new tactics.  During OIF, U.S. Army forces
utilized movement that was described by some as “swarm tactics.”  Because
networking allows soldiers to keep track of each other when they are out of one
another’s sight, forces could move forward in Iraq spread out in smaller
independent units, avoiding the need to maintain a tight formation.  Using
“swarm tactics,” unit movements are conducted quickly, without securing the
rear.  All units know each other’s location.  If one unit gets into trouble, other
independent units nearby can quickly come to their aid, “swarming” to attack the
enemy from all directions at once.  Benefits may include the following: (1) fewer
troops and less equipment are needed, so waging war is less expensive; (2) it is
harder for an enemy to effectively attack a widely dispersed formation; (3)
combat units can cover much more ground, because they do not have to maintain
a formation or slow down for lagging vehicles; (4) knowing the location of all
friendly units reduces fratricide during combat operations; and (5) swarming
allows an attack to be directed straight into the heart of an enemy command
structure, undermining support by operating from the inside, rather than battling
only on the periphery.  
(3) The way individual soldiers think and act on the battlefield is also changing.
When a unit encounters a difficult problem in the field, they radio the Tactical
Operations Center, which types the problem into an online chat room, using
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26  David Alberts, John Garstka, Frederick Stein, Network Centric Warfare, DOD Command
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Signal Forum, Signal Magazine, May 2003.
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of Transformation and Transparency, Security Studies Program Working Paper,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, E38-600, May 2003, p.15.
Microsoft Chat software.  The problem is then “swarmed” by experts who may
be located as far away as the Pentagon.24
(4) The sensor-to-shooter time is reduced.  Using NCW systems, soldiers in the field
have the capability to conduct an “on site analysis” of raw intelligence from
sensor displays, rather than waiting for return analysis reports to arrive back from
the continental United States.25  
Information Overrated.  Some observers state that Information Age
technology is making time and distance less relevant, and that information increases
the pace of events and the operational tempo of warfare.26  However, other observers
believe that networking for information exchange is not a sufficient substitute for
combat maneuver, and that information superiority and situational awareness are not
the most significant components of combat power.  As in a chess game, these
observers believe it is knowing the next move to make that is the key to success in
battle, for example, through correct analysis of an anticipated enemy movement and
tactics.27
Other observers also state that huge information resources may be overrated as
an asset for creating effective military operations, and that important military
decisions may not always lend themselves to information-based rational analysis.28
They argue that discussions of military transformation have overwhelmingly focused
on the rewards of information, and that the military services, national security
establishment, and intelligence community have not thoroughly studied the risks
associated with data-dependent military doctrine.29  Some of the issues raised by these
observers include:
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(1) Quantitative changes in information and analysis often lead to qualitative
changes in individual and organizational behavior that are sometimes counter-
productive.30   
(2) Reliance on sophisticated information systems may lead to management
overconfidence.31   
(3) An information-rich, opportunity-rich environment may shift the value of the
information, redefine the mission objectives, and possibly increase the chances
for perverse consequences. (See Appendix B, Perverse Consequences of Data-
Dependent Systems.)
Underestimating the Adversaries.  Some observers have wondered whether
proponents of NCW are making overstated claims, similar to exaggerated expectations
that led to the recent dot-com stock run-up and crash.  They believe that the DOD
model for network centric operations may underestimate an enemy’s ability to deceive
sensors, or block information needed for NCW.  One of the vulnerabilities cited by
observers may be the fact that DOD has openly published plans for using NCW
technologies in future warfare.  Just like the Maginot Line before World War I, an
enemy now has time to plan ways to avoid our strengths and attack our weaknesses.32
Interoperability.  Some question whether the U.S. military can achieve true
network and systems interoperability among all services.  According to statements
reportedly made by Army Major General Marilyn Quagliotti, vice director of the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), “We are still developing stovepipe
systems, [and] they are still getting through our governance structure.”  An example
cited is the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) which currently runs under
16 different databases, with multiple architectures specified for different military
branches and divisions.  However, DISA reportedly will soon field GCCS Version
4.0, with a new architecture designed to use only one master database.33  
DOD reportedly intends to integrate the network architectures of systems used
by all branches of the military to create a network centric capability linked to the
Global Information Grid (see below).  To help accomplish this integration, the DOD
Joint Staff has created a new Force Capability Board (FCB) to monitor NCW
programs for mismatches in funding, or mismatches in capability.  When an issue is
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detected, the FCB reports to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which then
provides information during budget deliberations at the Pentagon.34
Bandwidth Limitations.  Some observers question whether communications
bandwidth supply can be made adequate to match growing future military needs.
When the supply of bandwidth becomes inadequate during combat, military
operations officers have sometimes been forced to subjectively prioritize the
transmission of messages.  They do this by literally pulling the plug temporarily on
some radio or computer switching equipment in order to free up enough bandwidth
to allow the highest-priority messages to get through.  This can delay, or cancel other
messages or data transmissions, which are placed into in a lower priority.  Latency,
or delays in information updates resulting from a bandwidth shortage, could
theoretically leave some units attempting to fight the red display icons on their
computer screens, rather than the enemy, who might change position faster than screen
image information can be updated.
By the year 2010, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the supply of
effective bandwidth in the Army is expected to fall short of peak demand by a ratio
of approximately 1 to 10.35  According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration (ASD/NII), Paul Stenbit, the primary barrier to
achieving the NCW Internet paradigm is finding ways to meet the demand for
bandwidth.  Communications infrastructure must have enough bandwidth to allow,
for example, several people at different locations in the battlefield to pull the same
problem-solving data into their computer systems at the same time, without having to
take turns sharing and using the same available, but limited bandwidth.36   
Space Dominance.  The  United States is now highly-dependent on space
assets for communications, navigation, imagery, weather analysis, and missile early-
warning systems.  The United States has enjoyed space dominance during previous
Gulf conflicts largely because its adversaries simply did not exploit space, or act to
negate U.S. space systems.  However, the United States cannot rely on this same
advantage in the future, and we may expect less-technically advanced nations and non-
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state actors to employ electronic jamming techniques, or launch attacks against
satellite ground facilities.37  A non-state group could possibly also take advantage of
space-based technology by leasing satellite bandwidth, or purchasing high-resolution
imagery from suppliers in the Soviet Union, China, or other countries that own and
operate space assets.
In the future, satellites will be used for Space Based Radar (SBR), which will
provide persistent views of the battlefield, including accurate terrain information
needed for mapping.  However, there is growing doubt within the intelligence
community about the long-term future of satellite-based ISR.  As enemies become
more diverse and more unconventional, they may begin to utilize different
technologies, such as fiber optics, that are beyond the reach of satellite sensors.38
Outsourcing and Technology Transfer.  An increase in offshore
outsourcing of high tech jobs, including computer programming and chip
manufacturing, may enable a transfer of knowledge and technology that may
eventually threaten U.S. global technical superiority and undermine current NCW
advantages.39  The Gartner Group research firm has reported that corporate spending
for offshore information technology (IT) services will increase from $1.8 billion in
2003 to more than $26 billion by 2007, with half of the work going to Asian countries
such as India and China.40 
Contracting for national defense is reportedly among the most heavily outsourced
of activities in the federal government.41  Within DOD, the ratio of private sector jobs
to civil service jobs is nearly five to one, and has been increasing far in excess of non-
defense-related agencies.  While outsourcing may have been initially motivated by
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cost-reduction, the new trend is for more high-level research and development (R&D)
work to be done offshore, partly due to the growth in education and technology talent
now found among foreign workers.  For example, as early as 1998, Intel Corporation,
Microsoft Corporation, and other IT vendors opened R&D facilities in Beijing and
other parts of Asia.  Microsoft reportedly has 200 Ph.D. candidates and 170
researchers currently working in its Asia R&D facilities.42
Technology transfer also occurs for the manufacture of high-technology
equipment used to support NCW operations.  For example, only 20 percent of the
thermal batteries used in U.S. missiles, guided artillery, and guided bombs are
produced by domestic suppliers, while 80 percent of these devices are produced by a
foreign supplier.  Night-vision infrared devices that have formerly given U.S. forces
a tremendous military advantage are now manufactured with materials and
components that come almost entirely from foreign sources.43 
However, a recent study by DOD concluded that utilizing foreign companies as
sources for high-technology equipment does not affect long-term military readiness,
and that for the majority of high-technology items, several domestic suppliers are
available to meet DOD needs.44  In addition, some observers believe that U.S. high-
technology companies must retain flexibility to align their business operations as
necessary to meet customer needs.  For example, as the skill sets of foreign workers
increase, customers of high-technology suppliers gain expanded options for lower-cost
access to technical talent.  Observers have stated that companies that ignore
outsourcing trend do so at the peril of their long-term competitiveness.45 
Asymmetric Threats to Counter NCW  
The term “asymmetric”, when referring to strategies in warfare, is often intended
to describe attacks launched by a weaker, or less-well-equipped enemy, as they learn
to exploit a stronger opponent’s vulnerabilities.  Technology has provided an
asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces in recent conflicts. However, asymmetry
sometimes leads to unanticipated outcomes.  For example, video images showing the
overwhelming power of the U.S. military in recent urban conflicts  have been on
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display in the global news media.  Such images, resulting from the technological
efficiency of U.S. forces, may have given terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda
added power to spread rhetoric, recruit more members, and gain more indigenous
loyalty.46
Asymmetric countermeasures may include actions taken by an enemy to bypass
NCW sensors, or to negate the usefulness of high technology weapons.  Some
examples may include (1) suicide bombings; (2) hostile forces intermingling with
civilians used as shields; (3) irregular fighters and close-range snipers that swarm to
attack, and then disperse quickly; (4) use of bombs to spread “dirty” radioactive
material, or (5) chemical or biological weapons.  
Persons associated with terrorist groups are sometimes found to have received
advanced education in high-technology, and may also have knowledge of how to use
technology in an asymmetric attack against the supporting infrastructure for NCW.47
For example, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was arrested in 2003 for possible links
with Al Qaeda, reportedly studied engineering at a university in North Carolina.  A
student at the University of Idaho, who was recently arrested for alleged terrorist
connections, was studying in a Ph.D. program for cyber security,48 and several of the
9/11 terrorists reportedly had degrees in technology. 
Possible uses of technology to launch asymmetric attacks against NCW systems
may include (1) directed energy devices used to jam satellite signals;49 (2) directed
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energy devices that could theoretically burn out computer circuits at a distance,50 and
(3) malicious computer code to subvert controls for complex weapons.
Cyber Attacks Against Military Computers
DOD has taken steps to block access to some of the communications ports that
link the NIPRNET and the civilian Internet.  However, in October 2003, an intrusion
by a civilian hacker forced a NIPRNET website to be taken offline temporarily.51
Other hackers have also used the civilian Internet to successfully penetrate military
computers, causing measurable damage,52 and forcing portions of the military
computer network to shut down temporarily.53
There is growing controversy about whether the U.S. military should use general
purpose “open source” commercial computer software for the command, control, and
communications functions in advanced defense systems for tanks, aircraft and other
complex equipment.  An example is the popular computer operating system known
as “Linux”, which is labeled “Open-Source” software because it has been developed
by a worldwide community of contributing programmers who continuously add new
features by building on each others’ openly-shared source code.  Subscriptions are
purchased for commercial technical support of different versions of “open source”
software.  In contrast, the code for proprietary, or “Closed-Source” commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) software products, such as Microsoft Windows, is not openly
disclosed to the public.  
NSA has researched a secure version of Linux, but it is not clear that all military
computer systems are restricted by results of that research.54  Some experts believe
that open-source software violates many security principles, and may be subverted by
adversaries who could secretly insert Trojan horse malicious code to cause complex
defense systems to malfunction.  Other computer experts disagree, stating that
precisely because Linux is openly reviewed by a worldwide community of
contributing programmers, it has security that cannot easily be compromised by a
foreign agency.  
A recent study by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) states that
DOD currently uses a significant variety of open-source computer software programs,
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and concluded that open-source software is vital to DOD information security.  This
is partly because many information security tools used by DOD are built using open-
source code, and effective counterparts are not available from closed-source COTS
products.  The study also states that DOD Web services and DOD software
development would be disrupted without continued use of open-source software.  This
is because many tools that are basic to web design and software development are
based on open-source code.55   
Experts at the Naval Post Graduate School reportedly have stated that “software
subversion” can only be avoided by using “high-assurance” software that has been
proven to be free of any malicious code.56  Because of the added development rigor
and test procedures required for such proof,  high-assurance software would cost
considerably more than open-source software.57 
Key Military Programs 
The following are key programs related to NCW that are identified in the DOD
budget as Program Elements (PE) for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E).  Figures for FY2005 and beyond are estimates.
Net Centricity.  The Net Centricity program is intended to support information
technology activities for network-centric collaboration.  Horizontal Fusion is a
component that determines how quickly DOD and intelligence community programs
can be extended to a net-centric operational environment.  The GIG Evaluation
Facility is a component that tests interoperability of key systems in an end-to-end
manner, including the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Global Information
Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG BE) programs.
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Total PE Cost  —  — 214.225 216.015 219.464 231.226 236.086
Horizontal
Fusion
206.422 207.815 210.864 222.126 226.586
GIG
Evaluation 7.800 8.200 8.600 9.100 9.500
DOD Global Information Grid (GIG).   The GIG supports DOD and related
intelligence community missions and functions, and enables sharing of information
between all military bases, mobile platforms, and deployed sites.  The GIG also
provides communications interfaces to coalition, allied, and non-DOD users and
systems.  Older messaging systems, such as the Defense Message System (DMS),
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and the Global Combat Support
System (GCSS) will all be made accessible via the GIG.59  
DOD is planning, by 2008, that military communications equipment use the new
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) as the standard for all transmission through the
Global Information Grid (GIG), and for all DISN systems that will interoperate with
the GIG.60  The new IPv6 protocol will reportedly offer greater message security and
better tracking of equipment, supplies, and personnel through use of digital tags (See
Appendix A, The Transition from Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) to IPv6).  
Key service network architectures for implementing the GIG are the Air Force
C2 Constellation, Marine Corps Integrated Architecture Picture, Navy ForceNet, and
Army LandWarNet.61  These network architectures will become fully interoperable to
help realize the full potential of NCW.
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Table 2. Global Information Grid (GIG) Systems Engineering













Engineering 2.328 2.423 2.517 2.581 2.652 2.713 2.777
Air Force Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3).  The AT3
system combines information collected by an airborne network of sensors to identify
the precise location of enemy air defense systems.  The system relies on coordination
of information from different systems aboard multiple aircraft.63
Table 3. Sensor and Guidance Technology (AT3), 
PE 0603762E 64
($ in Millions)
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 (est.)
Air Force AT3 11.023 5.815 0.0
Air Force Link 16.  Tactical Data Links (TDLs) are used in combat for
machine-to-machine exchange of information messages such as radar tracks, target
information, platform status, imagery, and command assignments. The purpose of this
program element is to insure the interoperability of Air Force TDLs.  TDLs are used
by weapons, platforms, and sensors of all services.  Other TDLs include Link 11,
Situational AwarFY2eness Data Link (SADL), and Variable Message Format (VMF).
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Table 4. Link 16 Support and Sustainment, PE 0207434F.65













50.535 70.481 141.012 218.743 228.009 161.909 153.606
Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).  The CEC system links
Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated
air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on
a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network. Each unit in the
CEC network fuses its own radar data with data received from the other units. As a
result, units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense picture.
CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles
that the ship itself cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other units in the
network. It will also permit air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by
other ships or aircraft.66  
Table 5. Develop and Test CEC, PE 0603658N 67
 ($ in Thousands)
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 (est.)
Navy CEC 106,020 86,725 103,452
Army Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). 
FBCB2, used with Blue Force Tracker computer equipment, is the U.S. Army’s main
digital system that uses the Tactical Internet for sending real-time battle data to forces
on the battlefield.  During OIF, this system was used in some Bradley Fighting
Vehicles and M1A1 Abrams tanks, and effectively replaced paper maps and routine
reporting by radio voice communication.  The computer images and GPS capabilities
allowed tank crews to use Blue Force Tracker to pinpoint their locations, even amid
Iraqi sand storms, similar to the way pilots use instruments to fly in bad weather.68
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Table 6. Develop and Test FBCB2, PE 0203759A 69
 ($ in Thousands)
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 (est.)
Army FBCB2 59,887 47,901 23,510
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).  DOD has determined that future
military radio frequency communications systems should be developed in compliance
with the JTRS architecture.  JTRS is a family of common, software-defined,
programmable radios that will initially become the Army’s primary tactical radio for
mobile communications, including radios that are capable of communicating via
satellite.   The new JTRS devices will have routers built-in to support networks in the
battlefield, with the capability to dynamically re-form communications links whenever
one or more nodes or routers are interrupted.70  Reportedly there is some disagreement
among planners about whether the military should use laser-based communications
or JTRS radio waves for the space-to-ground communications link.  Currently, the
military services use different radio waveforms that have yet to be made
interoperable.71
Table 7. Develop and Test JTRS,  PE 0604280 (A,N,F) 72
 ($ in Thousands)
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 (est.)
Army JTRS 62,892 133,293 121,400
Navy JTRS 19,231 88,601 78,624
Air Force JTRS 13,667 38,096 49,856
Total: Army, Navy, Air Force 95,790 259,990 249,880
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS).  The J-UCAS program
combines the efforts previously conducted under the DARPA/Air Force Unmanned Combat
Air Vehicle (UCAV) program and the DARPA/Navy Naval UCAV (UCAV-N) program, for
a common architecture to maximize interoperability. 
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Table 8. Prove the Basic Technological Feasibility of J-UCAS, 
Advanced Technology and Risk Reduction,  PE 0603400D8Z.73 











Risk Analysis 0.0 284.617 77.785  —  —  — 
Table 9. Prove the Operational Value of J-UCAS, 
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Development 0.0 422.873 667.307 380.105 1043.498 986.156
Other Nations and NCW Capability  
Military organizations worldwide are creating responses to the challenges of
information age warfare.  Some countries, such as Sweden which uses the term
Network-Based Defense, may view NCW concepts and the promise of more efficiency
and effectiveness through networking with coalition partners, as a way to reduce
military budgets.75  Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands have all adopted the term
Network Centric Warfare; Australia uses the term Network-Enabled Warfare; the U.K.
uses the term Network-Enabled Capability; and, the armed forces of the Republic of
Singapore uses the term Knowledge-Based Command and Control.76  Observers have
reported that units of the Chinese military have been using computer systems for on-
line tactical simulation exercises.  The simulation involved networking and multi-
media presentations to train commanders and troops in an on-line classroom, where
battles are fought using an “electronic sand table”, and results are judged for scoring.
Officers and troops could also exchange messages and share information via the
CRS-21
77 Gao Zhongqi and Zhu Da, “Regiment of Nanjing MAC Improves Training Efficiency Via
Network,” PLA Daily, Feb. 5, 2004.
78 “NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), “ Times staff, Mar. 3, 2003, “NATO Starts
‘Transformation’ Process,”  NavyTimes.com, Feb. 5, 2004, [http://www.navytimes.com/].
79 Dag Wilhelmsen, Manager of NATO C3 Architecture, “Presentation on Information
Sharing Effectiveness of Coalition Forces Operations,” 4th Annual Multinational C4ISR
Conference, McLean, Virginia, May 6, 2004.
80 Some argue that OIF experiences validate Admiral Cebrowski’s view that technology is
not NCW, but rather only the enabler of NCW. Loren B. Thompson, CO Lexington Institute,
“ISR: Lessons of Iraq,”  Defense News ISR Integration Conference,  Nov. 18, 2003. See also
CRS Report RL31946: Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress.
81 Lt. General William Wallace, Commander Combined Arms Center, in U.S. Congress,
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, Hearing on Military C4I Systems, Oct. 21, 2003, [http://www.cq.com].
82 Some traditional virtues such as air superiority, may be under emphasized.  The review
process may  exaggerate the role of “jointness” and special operations, according to Loren
B. Thompson, Analyst at the Lexington Institute, “ISR: Lessons of Iraq, Defense News ISR
Integration Conference,” Nov. 18, 2003.  “The Iraqis made so many mistakes it would be
foolish to conclude that defeating them proved the viability of the new strategy,” Dan
Cateriniccia and Matthew French, “Network-Centric Warfare: Not There Yet,” Federal
Computing Week,  June 9, 2003, [http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0609/
cov-netcentric-06-09-03.asp]. 
network.77  The NCW capabilities under development by other countries include
technologies similar to what is described for joint U.S. forces in this report.
NATO is currently building a capability for dynamic interoperability with U.S.
forces in the future and is developing a framework for high-technology warfare using
the combined forces of multiple nations, called NATO Network Enabled Capabilities,
similar to the U.S. military’s Joint Vision 2020.78  Other NATO initiatives for
coalition operations include the Multinational Interoperability Program, the Cross
System Information Sharing Program, and the Multi-functional Air-based Ground
Sensor Fusion Program.79    
NCW Technology in Recent Military Operations 
OIF might be more accurately characterized as a transitional, rather than
transformational operation, because NCW technology was not fully deployed in all
units during OIF, and some systems were not user-friendly.80  Some observers feel that
OIF proved the effectiveness and potential of network enhanced warfare,81 while
others believe that it is hard to interpret the NCW experiences objectively, partly
because the review process may sometimes be distorted by the internal military bias
that favors force transformation.  Still others point out that the latest experiences using
NCW technology may be misleading because recent U.S. adversaries were weak and
incompetent, including Panama (1990), Iraq (1991), Serbia (1999), and Afghanistan
(2001).82  
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Network Communications.   Increased networking during OIF reportedly
allowed U.S. forces to develop a much improved capability for coordinating quick
targeting.  In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, coordinating efforts for targeting
required an elapsed time of as much as four days.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S.
forces reduced that time to about 45 minutes.83   During April 2003, the Marine Corps
Systems Command compiled comments from some soldiers about their experiences
using several new communications systems during combat operations in Iraq.
Comments from soldiers and other observers follow:
(1) Several communicators, operations officers, and commanders reportedly
stated that they felt generally overloaded with information, and sometimes
much of that information had little bearing on their missions.  They stated
that they received messages and images over too many different networks,
requiring them to operate a large number of different models of
communications equipment.84
(2) Some troops stated that when on the move, or when challenged by line-of-
sight constraints, they often used email and “chat room”85 messages for
communications (This usually required linking to a satellite).
(3) Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2), with Blue Force
Tracker, reportedly received widespread praise from troops for helping to
reduce the problem of fratricide.  Blue Force Tracker (BFT) is a generic
term for a portable computer unit carried by personnel, vehicles, or aircraft
that determines its own location via the Global Positioning System, then
continuously transmits that data by satellite communications.  The position
of each individual unit then appears as a blue icon on the display of all other
Blue Force Tracker terminals, which were used by commanders on the
battlefield, or viewed at remote command centers.  Clicking on any blue
icon would show its individual direction and speed.  A double-click
reportedly would enable transmission of a text message directly to that
individual unit, via satellite.
Satellites. Satellite communications played a crucial role for transmitting
message and imagery data during OIF operations, and also enabled a capability for
U.S. forces in the field to “reach back” to the continental United States for support.
However, a growing dependence on space communications may also become a critical
vulnerability for NCW.  
(1) During the OIF conflict, communications trunk lines, including satellite
transmissions, were often “saturated”, with all available digital bandwidth
used up.  The peak rate of bandwidth consumed during OIF was
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approximately 3 Gigabits-per-second, which is about 30 times the peak rate
consumed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.  DOD satellites cannot
satisfy the entire military demand for satellite bandwidth, and therefore
DOD has become the single largest customer for commercial or civilian
satellite services.  DOD sometimes leases commercial satellite bandwidth
through DISA, and at other times bypasses the process to buy directly from
industry.  However, bypassing DISA may reduce interoperability between
the services, and may increase redundancies. 86    
(2) Commercial satellites were used to supplement military communications,
which did not have enough capacity, despite the fact that a number of
military satellites were moved to a better geostationary orbital position for
both Afghanistan and Iraq.87
Radio Bandwidth and Latency. Some problems with delayed arrival of
messages during OIF may have occurred due to unresolved questions about managing
and allocating bandwidth.  Sometimes, when demand for bandwidth was high, NCW
messages with lower priority were reportedly dropped deliberately so that other
messages with a higher priority could be transmitted.88
(1) The speed with which U.S. forces moved, a shortage of satellite
communications, and the inability to string fiber nationwide hampered
efforts to provide adequate bandwidth.  At times, some commanders were
required to share a single communications channel, forcing them to wait to
use it whenever it became free.89
(2) Brigade-level command posts could view satellite and detailed UAV
images, but battalion-level commanders, and lower command levels, could
not view those same images.  The lower-level commands are where greater
detail is critical to fighting successfully.   
(3) Although the Army has invested in military-only decision-support systems,
some of the planning and collective decision-making during OIF was
handled through  email and chat-rooms that soldiers were familiar with, that
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were “user-friendly” and reliable, that were available when other systems
experienced transmission delays, and that required little or no training.90  
Air Dominance.  UAVs sometimes carry thermal cameras that can see through
darkness or rain.  These reportedly gave military planners so much confidence when
orchestrating raids, they often skipped the usual time-consuming rehearsals and
contingency planning.91  However, without early air dominance, UAVs and other
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft could not have been used
to provide information needed for NCW systems.  UAVs, and other support aircraft,
such as refueling support tankers, were nearly defenseless and reportedly could not
have operated deep in Iraqi air space without early air dominance. 
Operations in Iraq with Coalition Forces.  Using NCW technology with
coalition forces resulted in reduced fratricide during OIF.  However, during OIF,
coalition assets reportedly operated as separate entities, and coalition forces were often
locked out of planning and execution because most information was posted on
systems accessible only to U.S. forces.  For example, most major air missions, that
supposedly used NCW technology for coalition operations, involved only U.S.
aircraft.92  
Policy for sharing of classified information requires a separate contract
agreement between the United States and each coalition partner.  DOD currently
maintains 84 separate secure networks for NCW coalition operations; one for each
coalition partner.  This is because U.S. National Disclosure Policy restricts what
information may be released to coalition partners.93  In addition, each coalition partner
nation has a corresponding policy for release of its own sensitive information.  As a
result of these policies, operations planning information was spread to coalition forces
using a manual process, and the transfer of data fell behind combat operations.94  A
secure single network is required to efficiently share information among multiple
partners, with a capability to dynamically add and subtract coalition partners.  DOD
has initiated a program called “Network Centric Enterprise Services” (NCES, also
known as  “Horizontal Fusion”) to make information immediately available to any
coalition partners who need it, while also providing strong security through network
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encryption technologies and dynamic access controls.95  However, this technical
solution may not affect the differences in the individual policies that restrict
information sharing among coalition partners.
Oversight Issues for Congress
Potential oversight issues for Congress pertaining to NCW include the following.
Sufficient Information for Effective NCW Oversight 
Does Congress have sufficient information about the full scope of the
Administration’s strategy for implementing NCW to conduct effective oversight of
this effort?  Are programs critical for NCW adequately identified as such in the DOD
budget?  Does the Administration’s plan for defense transformation place too much,
too little, or about the right amount of emphasis on NCW?  Is the strategy for
implementing NCW paced too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right speed?  Does
the Administration’s strategy for implementing NCW programs call for too much, too
little, or about the right amount of funding?  How are “network centric” items
identified separately in the budget line items?
Sufficiently Joint NCW Planning 
Is the Administration’s strategy for implementing NCW sufficiently joint?  Is
there an overall DOD information architecture, or enterprise architecture?   Do the
current service network architectures — Army LandWarNet, Navy ForceNet, Air
Force C2 constellation — allow systems to work together through the GIG, or do they
enforce parochialism along service boundaries that is inconsistent with the Joint cyber
environment?
Military Support for Transformation and NCW 
What is the level of support within the military for the objectives of
transformation and NCW?  Observers reportedly state that flag officers, and technical
officers at lower levels, both have a strong interest in being able to operate in an
integrated manner and a net-centric environment.96  However, a recent study
concluded that while the strongest base of support for transformation is the senior
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officers, the junior military officers do not see transformation as something that is
important to them.97  
Effects of NCW on U.S. Defense Spending  
What are possible effects of NCW on the composition of U.S. defense spending?
What other programs might have to be reduced to pay for NCW programs?  Hardening
high technology systems against possible threats from a technically sophisticated
enemy is expensive.  NCW systems that are not hardened may not perform well, or
may be destroyed after a cyber attack, or an attack involving a directed energy weapon.
Networking with Coalition Forces 
 What are implications for future NCW operations with coalition forces and
foreign countries?  How well are coalition forces adapting to NCW?  Is it possible to
give Allies access to C4ISR information to improve collaboration during high-speed
combat operations, while still protecting other information that is sensitive or
classified?  Will differences in the national disclosure policies for each coalition
nation restrict sharing of necessary information among all partners during training
operations, and if so, will this threaten the effectiveness of training?  Will U.S.
analysts or warfighters be overwhelmed by the vast increase in information that will
flow if all coalition NCW networks are seamlessly linked to the U.S. NCW network?
A subset of the same issues that affect DOD operations with coalition partners may
also affect coordination with U.S. first-responders during domestic attacks by
terrorists.  Should DOD networks also be extended to first-responders who may need
support during possible widespread attacks involving nuclear bombs or biological
weapons; for example, geo-spatial images from UAVs monitoring domestic areas?
Should policy allow domestic first responders to input or view important data during
such an attack, even though some may not have clearances?  
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Value of NCW Information 
Is information overrated as an asset for NCW?  How thoroughly has the
administration studied the risks associated with data-dependent military doctrine?
Several observers have argued that DOD plans for NCW stress only the rewards of
information without including adequate analysis of the risks associated with possible
over-reliance on data-driven systems.  Some elite network centric corporations with
state-of-the-art systems that offer “information superiority” have experienced perverse
results, and sometimes even catastrophic economic losses (See Appendix B, Perverse
Consequences of Data-Dependent Systems).  Congress could encourage DOD to
examine the economics of information in order to avoid similar perverse consequences
on the battlefield that may be created by “information abundance.”98    
NCW Technology Transfer 
Does the Administration’s strategy pay sufficient attention to possible national
security issues related to technology transfer?  Technology transfer and offshore
outsourcing may increase the number of foreign-nationals who are experts in newer
Internet technologies and software applications (See Appendix A, The Transition from
IPv4 to IPv6.)   
Asymmetric Threats against NCW 
Does the Administration’s strategy for implementing NCW pay sufficient
attention to asymmetric threats and growth of technology skills in other countries?
How is DOD working with industry to find ways to protect software against cyber
threats, including those possibly related to offshore outsourcing of R&D and
information technology services?  Several policy options that may reduce risk to the
effectiveness of NCW due to growth of technology skills in foreign countries may
include (1) encourage companies to maintain critical design and manufacturing
functions inside the U.S., (2) encourage highly skilled individuals to relocate to areas
in the U.S. where industries are in need of technical professionals, or (3) encourage
U.S. high technology workers to update and increase their set of job skills.99
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Acquisition Strategies for NCW Technologies 
Does the Administration’s strategy for implementing NCW incorporate the right
technologies and acquisition strategy?  Future research into areas such as
nanotechnology will likely lead to radically new innovations in material science,
fabrication, and computer architecture.  However, the basic research to develop new
technologies requires high-risk investment, and increasingly involves international
collaboration.  To maintain a U.S. military advantage for NCW may require stronger
policies that encourage education in science and high-technology, and that nurture
long-term research that is bounded within the United States private sector,
universities, and government laboratories.100
(1) Technologies: Is DOD making sufficient investments for R&D in
nanotechnology?  Nanoscience may fundamentally alter military equipment,
weapons, and operations for U.S. forces, and possibly for future U.S. adversaries.
Does the Administration’s plan pay sufficient attention to creating solutions to
meet bandwidth requirements for implementing NCW?  Latency, which is often
caused by a bandwidth bottleneck, is an important complaint of fighters, “once
the shooting starts.”  How do messages that are either dropped, lost, or delayed
during transmission alter the effectiveness of Network Centric Operations?
(2) Acquisition:  All DOD acquisition programs require a key performance
parameter for interoperability and for successful exchange of critical
information.101  Development of some weapons in the past has rendered them
obsolete by the time they are finally produced, sometimes 15 to 20 years later.
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (retired), director of the Office of Force
Transformation reportedly wants program development cycles brought in line
with those of commercial industry, which are typically measured in months and
years, instead of decades.102  How does the traditional DOD long acquisition
cycle keep up with new commercial developments for high technology?103 
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NCW Doctrine 
Is DOD developing doctrine and training programs for NCW sufficient to keep
pace with rapid changes in technology?  NCW enables the military to fight with
smaller units, moving rapidly using “swarming tactics”. While smaller size combat
forces supports DOD concepts for NCW, several critics have argued that some of the
soldiers taken prisoner during OIF may have been spared if DOD had fielded a larger
force.104  Therefore, while NCW may enable swarming of smaller military units, it is
not clear whether terrorists or other adversaries can use similar tactics even more
effectively to counter some U.S. tactics.  Does doctrine for NCW also stress civilian
casualty prevention and protection, or does the goal of overwhelming force in
minimum time overrule those policy choices?   What are the changing requirements
for finding and recruiting personnel who are qualified to operate high-technology
NCW equipment?  Finally, if terrorist groups become more local and smaller in size,
will law-enforcement activities, coupled with good intelligence, displace military
operations as a more effective pre-emptive strategy for the future, partly because it
may be seen as less controversial?
Related Legislation
P.L. 108-136, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
This act requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress, in support of
the Department of Defense budget for FY2006, a report on the activities carried out
for the development of high-speed, high-bandwidth communications capabilities for
support of network-centric operations by the Armed Forces.  The report shall include
the following:  (1) A description of the joint R&D activities, and (2) An analysis of
the effects on recent military operations of limitations on communications bandwidth
and access to radio frequency spectrum.  Reports shall also be submitted to the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees for implementation of management for the
JTRS program, and for development of the FBCB2 Blue Force Tracking System.
H.R. 3911: This bill proposes to make ineligible for the receipt of Federal grants,
Federal contracts, Federal loan guarantees, and other Federal funding, any companies
that have outsourced jobs during the previous five years to companies outside the
United States, when those services were previously performed within the United
States.  Outsourcing for purposes of national security is exempted from this proposed
legislation.  On 3/4/2004, the bill was referred to the House Committee on
Government Reform.
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Appendix A
The Transition from Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) to IPv6
The U.S. military now uses several transport protocols for digital
communications, including Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4).  However, by 2008,
DOD is planning to convert digital military communications to use the new Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) as the standard for all transmission through the Global
Information Grid (GIG), and for all systems that are part of the Defense Information
System Network (DISN) that will interoperate with the GIG.  However, the transition
from IPv4 to IPv6 may go more smoothly for the U.S. military and for the Internet
infrastructure that supports global commerce in other countries, than for the
commercial Internet infrastructure within the United States, which may continue using
the older IPv4 protocol for a longer time because it is so firmly embedded. 
Because the new communications infrastructures that support Internet technology
in other countries will be built using newer equipment, much talent  for managing
IPv6 technology may eventually belong to many technicians and programmers who
reside in countries where the United States may have political differences.  Research
has shown that regional agglomeration of technical expertise increases active sharing
of tacit knowledge among groups of innovators.105  Some of that tacit knowledge may
also include sharing of information about newly-discovered vulnerabilities for the
IPv6 technology.  
What follows is a brief explanation of some technical differences between IPv4
and IPv6, and a discussion of possible economic and security issues related to the
coming transition to the new Internet protocol. 
Technical differences between IPv4 and IPv6.  Information is sent
through the Internet using packets (approximately 4000 digital bits per packet), and
which include the address of the sender and the intended destination. Internet Protocol
version 4 (IPv4) has been used globally since before 1983.  However, IPv4
information packets are designed to carry an address in a 32-bit field, which means
that IPv4 can only support approximately 4,000,000,000 Internet devices (computers,
routers, websites, etc.).  With Internet access expanding globally, and with more types
of equipment now using Internet addresses (e.g. cell phones, household appliances,
and PDAs) the number of Internet addresses needed for connected equipment could
soon exceed the addressing capacity of the IPv4 protocol.  
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For example, slightly more than 3 billion of the 4 billion possible 32-bit IPv4
addresses are now allocated to U.S.-operated ISPs.  In contrast, China and South
Korea, with a combined population of more than 1.3 billion, are allocated 38.5 million
and 23.6 million respectively.  Therefore, Asian counties are especially interested in
the possibilities that come with adoption of IPv6.  
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) quadruples the size of the address field from
32 bits to 128 bits (IPv1-IPv3, and IPv5 reportedly never emerged from testing in the
laboratory).  IPv6 could theoretically provide each person on the planet with as many
as 60 thousand trillion-trillion unique Internet addresses.  Theoretically, by switching
to IPv6, humanity will never run out of Internet addresses.  IPv6 is also believed to be
more secure than IPv4 because it offers a feature for encryption at the IP-level.
However, several drawbacks may slow the global adoption of the IPv6 standard.
Switching to IPv6 means that software applications that now use Internet addresses
need to be changed.  Every Web browser, every computer, every email application,
and every Web server must be upgraded to handle the 128-bit address for IPv6.  The
routers that operate the Internet backbone now implement IPv4 via computer
hardware, and cannot route IPv6 over the same hardware.  By adding software to route
IPv6 packets, the routers will operate more slowly, which may cripple the Internet.
Alternatively, upgrading and replacing the hardware for millions of Internet routers
would be very costly.  
IPv4 also uses a technology feature called Natural Address Translation (NAT)
which effectively multiplies the number of IP address that may exist behind any single
firewall.  This technology trick is widely employed within the United States, and its
usage also adds an extra layer of security to both commercial networks and home PC
networks that have a router.  NAT allows a home user to connect multiple PCs to their
home network, so they all can share a single IPv4 address behind the router/firewall.
By using NAT, it is possible, and certainly much cheaper, to put off or ignore the
problem of running out of IPv4 addresses.  At least temporarily, in the United States,
most technologists prefer sticking with NAT rather than switching over to IPv6.
Also, despite the new feature that allows IP-level encryption, there may be new
security problems associated with converting to IPv6.  Whenever new code is
deployed onto computers, undiscovered bugs are usually soon discovered through
study and repeated experimentation by hackers.  Therefore, IPv6 is sure to hold
security surprises that the designers have simply not found through extensive testing.
And because switching over to IPv6 will be a global undertaking, some of the newly
discovered security problems could possibly become critical, and even threaten the
functioning of the Internet itself.  
IPv6 also offers other technical advantages over IPv4.  For example, IPv6 makes
peer-to-peer communication between individual computers much easier than with
IPv4.  This will make applications like Internet telephony and next generation multi-
media groupware work much more smoothly.  
Technology Divide.   The opportunity to leapfrog past older Internet
technology may someday result in increased expertise in newer technology for
technicians and engineers who reside outside the United States.  For example,
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countries such as India, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq that are now building
new communications infrastructures for Internet commerce, may initially adopt the
latest network switching equipment using the newer IPv6 technology, and thus
leapfrog over IPv4.  
Meanwhile, industries in the United States, which are already heavily invested
in older IPv4 technology, may remain tied to IPv4 using the NAT technology for a
longer time.  This is because NAT can extend the useful life of older IPv4
applications, and can defer the cost of conversion by transferring that cost to the ISPs,
who would then set up gateways to translate between all IPv4 and IPv6 Internet traffic
going into and out of the United States.  The U.S. could then become divided from the
technology used in the rest of the world, at least for a while, by an IPv4/IPv6
difference that is similar to the U.S./metric divide we see today.106  
Possible Vulnerabilities
U.S. military forces, to save time and expense, sometimes connect staff at
multiple locations to the DOD secure SIPRNET network by using an encryption
technique known as tunneling, which lets users traverse a non-secure network to
access a top-secret one.  For example, Marine Corps staff recently began using
tunneling through the non-classified NIPRNET to extend the DOD classified
SIPRNET to 47 sites in the Marine Forces Pacific Command.107  However, during OIF
as much as seventy percent of NIPRNET traffic reportedly was routed through the
civilian communications infrastructure.  This means that when there is need for a high
volume of U.S. military communications, security may be partly dependent on
reliability of IPv6 equipment found in the civilian infrastructure and in commercial
satellites.108 
Countries with emerging communications infrastructures, and purchasing the
latest commercial network equipment, may also be the home countries of  those best
able to exploit IPv6 technical vulnerabilities.  If this includes countries where the
United States may be involved in military activity, hostile groups with appropriate
technical knowledge of IPv6 vulnerabilities may be positioned to attempt to interfere
with U.S. military communications.
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Appendix B
Perverse Consequences of Data-Dependent Systems
The Office of Force Transformation [http://www.oft.osd.mil/] has indicated that
DOD must continue to refine the rules and theory of network centric warfare through
simulation, testing, and experimentation.  This section describes that although some
experiences have shown that networking may increase certain advantages in warfare,
other experiences may also indicate that relying on information systems can
sometimes lead to unexpected results.  
Information-Age warfare is increasingly path-dependent, meaning that small
changes in the initial conditions will result in enormous changes in outcomes.  Speed
is an important characteristic for NCW because it enables a military force to define
initial conditions favorable to their interests, and then pursue a goal of developing
high rates of change that an adversary cannot outpace.109  To this end, whenever data-
links are employed between military units and platforms, digital information can be
shared and processed instantaneously, which  produces a significant advantage over
other military units that must rely on voice-only communications.  
Examples that illustrate this advantage are found in several training exercises
conducted in the 1990’s between Royal Air Force jets equipped with data-links,
referred to as Link-16, and U.S. Air Force jets with voice-only communications.  A
series of air-to-air engagements showed that the RAF jets were able to increase their
kill ratio over the U.S. jets by approximately 4-to-1.  Other training engagements,
involving more than 12,000 sorties using 2-versus-2, or 8-versus-16, aircraft showed
that jets equipped with Link-16 increased their kill ratio by 150 percent over those
aircraft having voice-only communications.  Similar results were seen in training
exercises involving Navy and Army units equipped with new networking
technology.110
However, some observers believe that important military decisions may not
always lend themselves to information-based rational analysis.111  They argue that the
military services, national security establishment, and intelligence community have
not thoroughly studied the risks associated with a data-dependent military doctrine.
Issues raised by these observers include the following:
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(1) Information flows may be governed by a diminishing marginal utility for
added effectiveness.  Quantitative changes in information and analysis may
lead to qualitative changes in individual and organizational behavior that
are sometimes counter-productive.   
(2) An information-rich, opportunity-rich environment may shift the value of
the information, redefine the mission objectives, and possibly increase the
chances for perverse consequences.
In 1999, large-scale army experimentation with better visualization of the
battlefield resulted in surprises such as requests for up to five times the normally-
expected amounts of ammunition.  Instead of concentrating on only critical targets, the
experimental army units were overwhelmed with the vast array of potential targets
they could now see.  The unprecedented requests for larger quantities of ammunition
caused logistical failures.  More information did not assure better decision-making,
but rather it exposed doctrinal flaws.112  
A similar effect was observed in later experiments conducted as part of the
Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework.  Ammunition was expended at
a faster rate, possibly because more information creates a target-rich environment.
These observations imply a possibly greater demand for logistics support.113 
Issues raise by other observers of data-driven systems are:
(3) Reliance on sophisticated information systems may lead to management
overconfidence.
(4) Different analytical interpretations of data may lead to disagreements
among commanders about who is best situated to interpret events and act
on them.
The past economic under-performance of many hedge fund organizations and
other technology firms that have employed very sophisticated network centric
management techniques may serve as examples to caution DOD against over-reliance
on data-driven military information systems.  For example, Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), a highly-leveraged multi-billion dollar hedge fund, and Cisco
Systems, a well-respected high-tech firm, both used sophisticated systems to track
market conditions and expand their data-driven “situational awareness” to gain and
maintain competitive advantage.  However, in 1998 a U.S. government-led
consortium of banks bailed out LTCM after its trading losses put the entire world’s
financial system at risk of meltdown.  Also, in 2001 Cisco was forced to take a $2.25
billion inventory write-down.  While there is yet no professional consensus explaining
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these poor performance problems, many analysts agree that the presumed excellence
of information systems may have invited managerial over-reliance, and that over-
reliance led to overconfidence.  Executives may have ignored unambiguous external
signals in favor of their own networked data.114    
Finally, some believe that more information imposes a higher degree of
accountability on actions.  Failure to minimize casualties or protect civilians may be
digitally reviewed and used to politicize flawed military decisions.
These observers suggest that modern portfolio theory, Bayesian analysis, and
Monte Carlo simulation are three quantitative tools that military decision makers
should explore if they want the benefits of information transparency to consistently
outweigh its costs.  These tools could answer questions, such as: (a) if information
were to be managed as a portfolio of investment risks much as asset classes like
equities, fixed income, and commodities, how would commanders diversify to
maximize their returns; (b) what information asset classes would they deem most
volatile; (c) what information would they see as most reliable; and (d) which
information classes would be co-variant, and which would be auto-correlated?115  
